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PROTECTING FIRST FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PETITIONS: CLOSING THE
OPENING LEFT BY GOMEZ
Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996)
I. INTRODUCrION
In Lonchar v. Thomas,' the Supreme Court held that a court may
not dismiss a first federal habeas corpus petition for ad hoc equitable
reasons outside the framework of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules.2
Lonchar involved a petitioner who filed his first federal petition nearly
eight years after a jury convicted him on three counts of malice mur-
der and one count of aggravated assault.8 In an opinion by Justice
Breyer, the Court first noted that a court cannot deny a stay of execu-
tion when a first petition contains claims worthy of consideration, be-
cause that court would abuse its discretion by allowing the case to
become moot as a result of the petitioner's death.4 Justice Breyer
then stated that the Eleventh Circuit improperly relied upon special
ad hoc equitable reasons in vacating Lonchar's stay of execution and
refusing to consider his first petition because of abusive delay.5 The
Court reversed the circuit court's decision because it was (1) contrary
to the gradual evolution of formal judicial, statutory, and rules-based
doctrines of law concerning habeas petitions, and (2) improperly
based on Gomez v. United States District Court for Northern District of Cali-
fornia,6 which was applicable only to successive petitions.7
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's real purpose in
Lonchar was to protect the availability of first federal habeas corpus
petitions by narrowing the scope of the per curiam opinion in Gomez.
The 1992 Gomez decision allowed for different valid interpretations of
whether a court is permitted to dismiss a first federal habeas corpus
petition based on a petitioner's abusive delay in filing the petition.8
1 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996).
2 Id. at 1298.
3 Brief of Respondent at 1, Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996) (No. 95-5015).
4 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1297.
5 Id. at 1298.
6 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
7 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1298-1303.
8 See Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653-54.
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Justice Breyer could have entirely avoided this problem based on the
Court's unanimous opinion that Larry Lonchar's conduct was not
abusive." Instead, Breyer chose to limit the applicability of Gomez to
successive petitions, and thereby prevented lower courts from using
the "abuse of the writ" doctrine to dismiss first petitions.10 This note
further argues that Justice Breyer's protection of first petitions was
consistent with congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE ORIGINS AND EARLY HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS LAW
For the imprisoned, the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus is a proce-
dural safeguard protecting personal liberty."1 The protection of the
writ originated in English common law.'2 Article I, section 9 of the
United States Constitution also guarantees the writ: "[t]he Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'1 3
The writ was not designed to adjudicate the guilt of a prisoner, but
merely allows the prisoner to contest the validity of his or her impris-
onment.' 4 Accordingly, the Judiciary Act of 178915 first empowered
federal courts to issue the writ to federal prisoners who wanted to
challenge the jurisdiction of their confining court' 6 or to challenge
detention without proper legal process by the President.' 7 There was
no expansion of the Great Writ's protection until 1867, when Con-
gress also gave state prisoners the chance to contest their confinement
in federal court.'8
However, the Act of 1867 did not explicitly define the scope of
the writ or the procedures associated with it.19 Therefore, courts in
the late nineteenth century usually followed the common law practice
that resjudicata2° did not apply to a dismissed habeas corpus petition,
9 The fourJustices who chose not to join the majority opinion still concurred in the
judgment. Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1295.
10 See id. at 1297, 1301.
11 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963).
12 Id. at 400.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
14 Fay, 372 U.S. at 423-24 n.34.
15 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1848).
16 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991) (citing Ex parte Watkins, 7 L. Ed. 650
(1830)).
17 Id. (citing Exparte Wells, 15 L. Ed. 421 (1856)).
18 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (Little, Brown 1868) (codified as 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1994)).
19 Fay, 372 U.S. at 405-06.
20 Normally, the principle of resjudicata dictates that a final judgment rendered by a
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and prisoners were free to successively petition other courts.21 When
the appeal process for denial of these petitions later became available,
confusion developed.22 Some state courts denied habeas corpus ap-
peals based on res judicata23 while others used an intermediate ap-
proach allowing smaller numbers of successive petitions.24
The Supreme Court finally resolved the confusion in 1924 with
Salinger v. Loise25 and Wong Doo v. United States.26 These two cases
clearly established that res judicata does not apply to the denial of
federal habeas corpus petitions27 and laid the groundwork for what
would later be known as the "abuse of the writ" doctrine.28 Due to the
availability of appellate review, the Court determined in Salinger that
successive petitions should be
disposed of in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided and
controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the
propriety of the discharge sought. Among the matters which may be
considered, and even given controlling weight, are (a) the existence of
another remedy, such as a right in ordinary course to an appellate review
in the criminal case, and (b) a prior refusal to discharge on a like
application. 29
Soon after Salinger, the Court applied that decision's rule in Wong
Doo.30 The petitioner there presented two claims in his original peti-
tion, but argued only one.3' After the district court denied his peti-
tion, he attempted to raise the abandoned claim in a successive
petition which the court also dismissed.3 2 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's ruling because the petitioner had ample op-
portunity to offer proof of his abandoned claim when he brought his
first petition, and had no reason for not doing so.as The Court noted
that "[t]o reserve the proof for use in attempting to support a later
petition, if the first failed, was to make an abusive use of the writ of
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties
and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same
claim, demand or cause of action. BIAcI's LAw DIcnONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
21 Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1924).
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., McMahon v. Mead, 139 N.W. 122, 123 (S.D. 1912); ExparteHeller, 131 N.W.
991, 994 (Wis. 1911).
24 See, e.g., Ex parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62, 66 (S.D. Cal. 1889).
25 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
26 265 U.S. 239 (1924).
27 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 480 (1991) (quoting Salinger, 265 U.S. at 230).
28 See id. at 481 (quoting Salinger, 265 U.S. at 231).
29 Salinger, 265 U.S. at 231.
30 265 U.S. at 24041.
31 Id. at 240.
32 Id.




The Court next addressed abuse of the writ in 1948.35 In Price v.
Johnston, the Court delineated the burdens of both the government
and the petitioner regarding possible abuse of the writ.86 The Court
held that the State must be clear and particular in establishing that a
petitioner has abused the writ with a successive petition.37 If the State
met this standard, then the burden shifted to the petitioner to show
that he or she had a valid reason for the delay in presenting a new
claim.8 8 The Court gave two examples of valid reasons: acquiring new
relevant information or being unaware of the significance of prior
known facts. s9
B. 1948-1976: CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW PERTAINING TO
SUCCESSIVE HABEAS PETITIONS
One month after the Court decided Price, Congress enacted 28
U.S.C. § 2244, the first statute dealing with successive federal habeas
corpus petitions. 40 This statute allowed a federal court to dismiss a
subsequent petition that presented no new grounds for relief.41 Some
interpreters believed by negative implication that Congress was also
forcing courts to accept petitions that alleged any new relief
grounds.42 However, this would have been contrary to common law
principles recognizing that new claims could constitute abuse if a peti-
tioner unreasonably excluded them from prior petitions.4 3 Anticipat-
ing this confusion, the Reviser's Note to the statute pointed out that
Congress did not intend to disrupt the judicial evolution of habeas
principles," so the abuse of the writ doctrine which the Court devel-
oped in Wong Doo and Price remained unchanged.45
In 1963, the Court confirmed the unchanged status of the abuse
of the writ doctrine in Sanders v. United States.4 The Sanders Court
dealt with a related provision of the judicial code, 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
which allowed a federal district court to refuse to entertain a subse-
34 Id. (alteration omitted).
85 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
86 Id. at 292-93.
37 1& at 292.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 291.
40 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 483 (1991).
41 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1948).
42 MGeskey, 499 U.S. at 483.
43 Id. at 483-84.
44 Id.




quent habeas corpus petition seeking "similar relief."47 The Court
simplified its analysis by concluding that § 2255 was the "material
equivalent" of § 2244, and that § 2255 did not announce a stricter
abuse of the writ standard.48 With this equivalence in mind, the Court
moved on to describe its interpretation of § 2244's coverage.49 The
Court explained that this statute addressed only a first situation of
successive petitions based on relief grounds which a court had already
heard and dismissed on the merits.50 The Court distinguished a sec-
ond situation commonly giving rise to abuse of the writ-where a peti-
tion contains a different ground for relief, or an earlier ground for
relief which the petitioner abandoned 5 -and stated that it was not
within the statute's coverage. 52 Where this second situation arose, a
court could avoid considering the petition's merits only if there had
been an abuse of the writ.53 The opinion then stated that a court was
to use equitable principles as a guide when determining if there had
been abuse, including the principle that "a suitor's conduct in rela-
tion to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks."54
The Court gave examples:
if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collat-
eral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being
granted two hearings rather than one.., he may be deemed to have
waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the
withheld ground. The same may be true if, as in WongDoo, the prisoner
deliberately abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing. Nothing
in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate
needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings
whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.55
In 1966, Congress amended § 2244, accounting for the distinc-
tion drawn by the Court in Sanders.56 Congress wanted to "in-
troduc[e] a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus
proceedings."5 7 Subsection (b) of the amended statute addressed the
second situation involving successive petitions, the situation which the
Sanders Court found to be outside the prior statute's coverage. 58 The
amended statute allowed a court to dismiss at its discretion this type of
47 McCley, 499 U.S. at 484.
48 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 13-14.
49 See id. at 12.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 17.
52 Id. at 12.
53 Id. at 17.
54 Id. at 17-18 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963)).
55 Id. at 18.
56 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 485-86 (1991).
57 S. REP. No. 89-1797, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.G.C.A.N. 3663, 3664.
58 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 486.
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successive petition unless the petitioner alleged a new ground for re-
lief and had not intentionally withheld the new ground or "otherwise
abused the writ."59 If the petitioner met these conditions, the court
was required to consider the merits of the petition as long as there
were no other habeas errors such as nonexhaustion of state remedies
or procedural default.60 Conversely, even when a petition was clearly
abusive, Congress did not intend the amended statute to limit a
court's discretion to hear the petition if the court so chose.6'
In 1976, Congress approved the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus
Proceedings [hereinafter Federal Habeas Corpus Rules].62 Rule 9 (b),
like § 2244(b), addressed the problem of a petitioner raising new
grounds for relief in successive petitions:63
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it
fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determi-
nation was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged,
the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds
in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.64
An earlier draft of Rule 9 (b) included the phrase "was not excusable"
instead of the "constituted an abuse of the writ" language. 65 However,
Congress eventually decided that "the 'not excusable' language cre-
ated a new and undefined standard that gave a judge too broad a
discretion to dismiss a second or successive petition .... The 'abuse of
the writ' standard brings Rule 9(b) into conformity with existing
law."66 Thus, similar to its enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), Con-
gress had again codified the principles set forth in Sanders.67
Rule 9 (a) addressed another problem in habeas corpus proceed-
ings-delay in filing petitions-on which judicial abuse of the writ
doctrine did not touch.68 Rule 9(a) stated:
[a] petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the
respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to
the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is
based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the
exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to
the state occurred.69
59 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1994).
60 MCMkey, 499 U.S. at 486-87.
61 Id. at 487.
62 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
63 McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 487.
64 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1994).
65 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1471, at 5 (1976), repfinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2481-82.
66 Id.
67 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521 (1982) (plurality opinion).
68 See Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (1996).
69 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a) (1994).
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While this rule is directly applicable to both first and successive
petitions, in either case the state must still make a particularized show-
ing that the delay prejudiced its ability to respond.70 Another rule,
Rule 4, is also relevant to both first and successive petitions.71 It au-
thorizes a court to dismiss a federal habeas petition summarily when
"it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits an-
nexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief ... "72 If the
court can dismiss the petition on its merits, the court obviously does
not have to further address those merits in another proceeding and
can deny a stay of execution for a condemned prisoner.73
C. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN ABUSE OF THE WRIT DOCTRINE
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court held that the reverse
principle of Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 4(a) is also true in the con-
text of federal appeals: namely, if a court cannot dismiss a petition on
its merits, the court must address those merits and stay a pending exe-
cution.74 In Barefoot v. Estelle, a district court had denied a first federal
habeas petition, but subsequently issued a certificate of probable
cause for the petitioner to appeal to a circuit court.75 Since this certif-
icate of probable cause meant that the circuit court could not dismiss
the petition on its merits, the Supreme Court ruled that the circuit
court must grant a stay of execution pending disposition of the peti-
tioner's claims. 76 Failing to grant the stay could have allowed the case
to become moot as a result of the prisoner's execution.77
Two more recent decisions have also impacted the abuse of the
writ doctrine.78 The first came in 1991 when the United States
Supreme Court decided McCleskey v. Zant.79 The Court established a
new, separate legal standard for abuse of the writ.8 0 In addition to the
Sanders example of deliberately abandoning a claim and then replead-
ing it in a subsequent petition,8' the Court decided that it would also
find abuse of the writ if a petitioner raises a new claim in a subsequent
petition which the petitioner did not raise earlier because of "inexcus-
70 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
71 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (1994).
72 Id.
73 See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1297.
74 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 89-94 (1983).
75 Id. at 885.
76 Id. at 893-94.
77 Id.
78 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for N.
Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
79 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
80 Id. at 489.
81 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963).
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able neglect."8 2 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that
the Court had no discretion to redefine the legal standard because
Congress had already codified the "deliberate abandonment" test
from Sanders.83
The second recent decision affecting the abuse of the writ doc-
trine is the 1992 per curiam opinion of Gomez v. United States District
Court for the Northern District of California.8 There, a petitioner tried to
challenge his forthcoming method of execution via a non-habeas stat-
ute.8 5 With the exception of a one-sentence fact statement, the full
pertinent text of the Court's opinion vacating the petitioner's stay of
execution was as follows:
This action is an obvious attempt to avoid the application of McCledky v.
Zant to bar this successive claim for relief. [The petitioner] has now
fied four prior federal habeas petitions. He has made no convincing
showing of cause for his failure to raise the claim in his prior petitions.
Even if we were to assume, however, that [the petitioner] could
avoid the application of McCleskey to bar his claim, we would not con-
sider it on the merits. Whether his claim is framed as a habeas petition
or as [an alternative] action, [the petitioner] seeks an equitable remedy.
Equity must take into consideration the State's strong interest in pro-
ceeding with its judgment and [the petitioner's] obvious attempt at ma-
nipulation. This claim could have been brought more than a decade
ago. There is no good reason for this abusive delay, which has been
compounded by last-minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process.
A court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay
execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.8 6
I1. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 13, 1986, Larry Grant Lonchar killed Charles Wayne
Smith, Steven Smith and Margaret Sweat in a condominium in
DeKalb County, Georgia.8 7 Charles Wayne Smith and his son, Steven
Smith, ran a bookmaking operation out of the condominium to which
Larry Lonchar owed several thousand dollars.88 On the night of the
murders, Lonchar and a companion, Mitchell Wells, knocked on the
82 McCeis, 499 U.S. at 489. The Court equated "inexcusable neglect" with the "cause
and prejudice" standard used in the state procedural default context for habeas petitions.
Id. at 493. This meant that "inexcusable neglect" would be present unless the petitioner
showed cause for not bringing the claim earlier and actual prejudice resulting from the
alleged errors. Id. at 493-94 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982)).
83 Id. at 512 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
85 Id. at 653.
86 Id. at 653-54 (citations omitted).




condominium's door and entered the living room which was then oc-
cupied by Wayne Smith, Steven Smith, and Margaret Sweat.s9 Richard
Smith, another son of Wayne Smith, was in a back bedroom.90
Lonchar displayed a badge, falsely identified himself as special
agent Larry Lonchar, and proceeded to handcuff Wayne and Steven
Smith. 91 Both Lonchar and Wells then killed Wayne Smith by shoot-
ing him in the chest, the back, and the head; they killed Steven Smith
by shooting him in the chest and the head. 92 Lonchar shot Sweat in
the shoulder, but he did not initially kill her.93 Wells entered the back
bedroom and shot Richard Smith several times,94 but Smith feigned
death and avoided further harm while Lonchar and Wells ransacked
the condominium. 95 The assailants then left the condominium. 96
Lonchar returned a short time later to find Sweat on the telephone
speaking to a 911 operator,97 at which point he killed her, stabbing
her 17 times in the neck and three times in the chest before leaving
the condominium for the last time.98
Later that evening, Lonchar went to his cousin's house. 99 He
complained to his cousin that he "couldn't kill the bitch," and told his
cousin that he had cut Sweat's throat.100 Lonchar's cousin drove him
to Chattanooga, where he caught a plane to Texas.101 Police later ar-
rested Lonchar in Mission, Texas, when he attempted to pick up
money that his cousin wired to him. 10 2
Larry Lonchar was indicted in DeKalb County for both the felony
and malice murders of Charles Wayne Smith, Steven Smith and Mar-
garet Sweat and the aggravated assault of Richard Smith.' 0 3 During
his trial, Lonchar refused to assist his attorney in preparing his de-
fense, specifically requested to remain absent from the trial proceed-
ings whenever possible and told the judge that "being realistic . . .I




92 Id. at 751.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 750.
96 Id.
97 Id.





103 Brief of Respondent at 1, Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996) (No. 95-5015).
104 Lonchar, 369 S.E.2d at 752.
105 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996) (No. 95-5015).
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Lonchar guilty on three counts of malice murder (mooting the felony
murder indictments) and one count of aggravated assault.106 He re-
ceived a sentence of death by electrocution for the three counts of
murder and twenty years imprisonment for the aggravated assault con-
viction.' 07 After the court denied a motion for a new trial, Lonchar's
case came up for mandatory appellate review over his objection, 08
and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the sentences and convic-
tions on July 13, 1988.109 After initially refusing to authorize any col-
lateral attacks on his conviction or sentence and writing the trial judge
to request an execution date," 0 Lonchar made the first of numerous
about-faces regarding his desire to die"' by authorizing the filing of a
petition for certiorari which the United States Supreme Court de-
nied." 2 In early March, 1990, the Superior Court of DeKalb County
issued a warrant authorizing Lonchar's execution during the week be-
ginning March 23, 1990."1
Two days before the scheduled execution and against Larry
Lonchar's wishes, his sister, Chris Kellogg, filed a "next friend"" 4
habeas corpus petition in state court on March 21, 1990, claiming that
Lonchar was incompetent"n5 She set forth his history of serious
mental illness and supported it with new psychological evaluations." 6
Most of her sixteen claims for relief asserted that Lonchar had not
received a fair trial and sentencing because of his psychological
problems." 7 However, on March 28, 1990, the state court found
Lonchar competent and thus dismissed Kellogg's petition because she
had no standing." 8 The Georgia Supreme Court subsequently af-
firmed the competency finding" 9 and the United States Supreme
106 Respondent's Brief at 1, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
107 Id.
108 Petitioner's Brief at 7, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
109 Lonchar v. State, 369 S.E.2d 749, 754-55 (Ga. 1988).
110 Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1295 (1996).
III Petitioner's Brief at 7, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
112 Lonchar v. Georgia, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989).
113 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1295.
114 A "next friend" is a person acting for the benefit of either an infant or another
person unable to look after his or her own interests or to manage his or her own lawsuit.
The next friend is not a regularly appointed guardian. BLAcK's LAw DIc'rIoN~m" 1043 (6th
ed. 1990).
115 Petitioner's Brief at 7-8, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
116 Id. at 8.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 8-9. A third person cannot raise a legal claim for an individual if the individual
is capable of bringing the claim herself. If the court had judged Lonchar to be incompe-
tent, then his sister would have had standing to bring the claim as a next friend.
119 Kellogg v. Zant, 390 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. 1990).
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Court denied Kellogg's petition for certiorari. 20 Kellogg then
presented the same claims in a next friend habeas petition in federal
court on October 23, 1990.121 Although the federal judge accepted
the unanimous opinion of several psychiatrists that Lonchar had a
mental illness,' 22 he ruled that Lonchar was competent and dismissed
Kellogg's petition.'23 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, 124 and the U.S. Supreme Court again denied certiorari. 25
In early February, 1993, the Superior Court of DeKalb County issued a
warrant authorizing Lonchar's execution during the week beginning
February 24, 1993.126
Larry Lonchar then uncharacteristically authorized his own
habeas corpus petition in Georgia state court on February 24, 1993,
less than an hour before his scheduled execution. 27 Lonchar subse-
quently changed his mind and asked to withdraw the petition.128 On
January 16, 1995, with the state conceding that the action was appro-
priate, the state court dismissed the habeas petition without preju-
dice. 12 9 The DeKalb County court later issued a death warrant for the
third time, this time authorizing Lonchar's execution during the week
beginning June 23, 1995.130
Milan Lonchar, Larry's brother, then filed his own "next friend"
habeas petition in Georgia state court requesting a new competency
examination for Larry Lonchar.131 Milan Lonchar presented affida-
vits from two psychologists who believed Larry Lonchar might be in-
competent based on his generally bizarre behavior-a 1993 suicide
attempt in prison, his uncertainty about whether he wanted to live
and his admittance that he led to experts during previous compe-
tency evaluations.' 3 2 A state expert who had found Lonchar compe-
tent during proceedings three years earlier also submitted an affidavit
questioning the reliability of his previous findings.'33 Despite these
120 Kellogg v. Zant, 498 U.S. 890 (1990).
121 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
122 Id. at 11 n.29.
123 Id. at 10-11.
124 Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 642 (11th Cir. 1992).
125 Lonchar v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 1378 (1993).
126 Petitioner's Brief at 11, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
127 Brief of Respondent at 5, Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996) (No. 95-5015).
This may have been a direct response to Lonchar's brother threatening to commit suicide
if Lonchar did not seek to stop the execution. See Petitioner's Brief at 11, Lonchar (No. 95-
5015).
128 Respondent's Brief at 5-6, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
12q Petitioner's Brief at 12-13, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
130 Id. at 13.
131 Id.
132 Id.
13 Id. at 13-14.
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statements, and noting that Larry Lonchar himself opposed the "next
friend" petition, the court found Lonchar competent and dismissed
the petition for lack of standing on June 21, 1995.'4 The Georgia
Supreme Court denied a certificate of probable cause to appeal and
denied a stay of execution on June 22, 1995.135 A federal district
court'3 6 and the Eleventh Circuit'37 also dismissed Milan Lonchar's
petition on June 22, 1995, and June 23, 1995, respectively.
On June 23, 1995, Larry Lonchar again changed his mind and
decided to file his second petition for habeas corpus relief in his own
behalf in Georgia state court.ls' He presented twenty-two claims and
told the court he wished to pursue each, but that his purpose was to
delay his execution in the hope that Georgia would change to lethal
injection execution so he could donate his organs.' 3 9 After temporar-
ily staying the execution, the court denied the petition on June 25,
1995, because Lonchar did not show a genuine intention to pursue
most of his claims.140
Lonchar immediately filed the same twenty-two claims in his first
federal habeas corpus petition.141 The State requested dismissal of
the petition on two grounds: first, the State felt Lonchar's conduct in
waiting almost six years to file his first federal petition constituted "in-
equitable conduct";142 and second, the State believed that Lonchar
had waived his federal claims by not raising them at previous opportu-
nities.143 The district court found no inequitable conduct because
Lonchar's petition presented significant issues concerning the validity
of his conviction and sentence which no federal court had previously
reviewed.'4 It noted that Habeas Corpus Rule 9 authority to dismiss
for "abuse of the writ" specifically applied only to second or successive
habeas petitions.145 The court was unsure about the State's waiver
claim, so it ordered a stay of execution on June 28, 1995, to consider
that issue further 4 6 The next day, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
stay, asserting that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 pre-
134 Id. at 15.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 1995).
138 Brief for Petitioner at 15, Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996) (No. 95-5015).
139 Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1296 (1996).
140 Petitioner's Brief at 16, Londiar (No. 95-5015).
141 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1296.
142 Id.
143 Petitioner's Brief at 16, Lonhar (No. 95-5015).





cluded even this first habeas petition. 147 The Eleventh Circuit took
note of the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Gomez v. United
States District Court for the Northern District of California,' which it read
to bar relief even for first petitions when the petitioner's conduct is
abusive.149 Regardless of the waiver claim, the Eleventh Circuit held
Lonchar's conduct was abusive because of his lengthy delay in filing
his petition and his failure to raise the issues during the "next friend"
proceedings. 150
Lonchar then filed an application with the United States
Supreme Court to stay the execution, and simultaneously filed a peti-
tion for certiorari.' 5 ' OnJune 29, 1995, the Court granted the stay of
execution and the petition for certiorari 52 to consider whether the
Court of Appeals could properly dismiss a first habeas petition for spe-
cial ad hoc "equitable" reasons not within the framework of Rule 9.153
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by Justice Breyer,154 the Supreme Court
overruled the Eleventh Circuit's decision vacating Larry Lonchar's
death sentence. 155 Justice Breyer first noted that when a first habeas
corpus petition presents original claims that are worthy of considera-
tion but a court still denies a stay, that court abuses its discretion by
allowing the case to become moot as a result of the petitioner's execu-
tion.156 Thus, although the Court was dealing with an order vacating
a stay of execution, the analysis was the same as if it were considering
an order to dismiss a first habeas petition. With that in mind, the
Court then listed six main reasons supporting its holding that the
Eleventh Circuit incorrectly vacated Lonchar's stay of execution by im-
properly relying upon special ad hoc "equitable" reasons which
neither the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules nor prior precedents
embody.157
Justice Breyer began by asserting that the court of appeals could
147 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995).
148 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
149 Lonchar, 58 F.3d at 593.
150 Id.
151 Petitioner's Brief at 19, Lonchar (No. 95-5015).
152 Lonchar v. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995).
153 Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1298 (1996).
154 Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and GinsburgjoinedJustice Breyer in the major-
ity opinion.
155 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1303.
156 Id. at 1297.
157 Id. at 1298-1303.
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only lawfully vacate Lonchar's stay of execution if that court could
lawfully dismiss his first federal habeas corpus petition. 58 He noted
that vacating the stay--and thus executing Lonchar-would effec-
tively dismiss the petition because it would prevent the court from
considering the petition's merits.' 59 Prior precedent from Barefoot v.
Estelle had established that "a court of appeals, where necessary to pre-
vent the case from becoming moot by the petitioner's execution,
should grant a stay of execution pending disposition of an appeal
when a condemned prisoner obtains a certificate of probable cause
on his initial habeas appeal." 60 The Court determined that this same
principle logically applies to a district court faced with a similar di-
lemma; thus, a petitioner like Larry Lonchar, whose claims the court
cannot summarily dispose of on the merits, must receive a stay of exe-
cution until such time as the court can properly adjudicate the
claims.' 6 '
The Court then rejected the concurrence's proposition that the
per curiam opinion of Gomez v. United States District Court for Northern
District of California'62 had displaced the rationale of Barefoot.163 Gomez
said that a "court may consider the last-minute nature of an applica-
tion to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable re-
lief."' 64 However, Justice Breyer distinguished Gomez because, unlike
the court in Lonchar's case, the Court in Gomez could have justifiably
dismissed the habeas petition within the existing framework of the
Federal Habeas Corpus Rules.' 65 Thus, Breyer argued that Gomez did
not create ad hoc standards for first federal petitions, and the concur-
rence's reading of that opinion seriously conflicted "with Barefoots
well-settled treatment of first habeas petitions." 66
The Supreme Court next answered the question of whether a
court could properly use the Eleventh Circuit's special ad hoc "equita-
ble" reasons, even though they are not within the framework of Rule
9, to dismiss a first federal habeas petition.' 67 In concluding it was
improper to use these special ad hoc reasons, the Court noted first
that the history of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shows the gradual evolu-
158 Id. at 1296.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1297 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893-94 (1983)).
161 Id.
162 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
163 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1297.
164 Id. (citing Gome; 503 U.S. at 654).
165 Id. The court could have dismissed the petition as an "abuse of the writ" under
Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) because it was a fifth attempt at review regarding an
issue which the petitioner could have easily raised in an earlier petition.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1298.
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tion of formal judicial, statutory, and rules-based doctrines, and not
individual judges. dismissing writs at their discretion. 168 Congress, the
Rule writers, and courts had developed principles that regularized
and narrowed judicial discretion. 169 Justice Breyer pointed out that
those principles seek to maintain the courts' freedom to issue the writ,
and they reflect a balancing of objectives which Congress normally
makes, but which courts will make when Congress has not resolved
the question. 170
Secondly, the majority emphasized that a court cannot ignore the
principles embodied in statutes, rules, and precedents even if the writ
is considered an "equitable" remedy.171 Justice Breyer noted that eq-
uitable rules guiding lower courts "reduce uncertainty, avoid unfair
surprise, minimize disparate treatment of similar cases, and thereby
help all litigants, including the State, whose interests in 'finality' such
rules often further."172 While criticizing any departure from settled
rules, the Court was particularly concerned about ad hoc dismissals of
first federal habeas petitions which would entirely deny petitioners the
writ's protection. 173 The Court noted that Federal Habeas Corpus
Rule 4 presents a concrete standard for deciding whether first habeas
petitions are worthy for a court to consider, obviating the need for any
ad hoc judgments. 174
As its third point, the Court emphasized that the use of ad hoc
rules was unnecessary and inappropriate because Congress specifically
addressed the main factor which led the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss
Lonchar's petition-delay-in Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a).17 5 The
Court noted that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 9(a) if by an
unnecessary delay in filing the state is prejudiced in its ability to re-
spond to the petition. 176 However, the State specifically did not rely
on Rule 9 (a), so the Eleventh Circuit's ad hoc "equitable" reasons for
dismissal did not include a finding of prejudice. 177 The Court
pointed out that when the Rules' framers included the prejudice re-
quirement, they did so to acknowledge "the equitable maxim that a
168 Id.; See e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479-89 (1991); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436, 451 (1986) (plurality opinion); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 (1983);
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313
(1963).
169 Lonhar, 116 S. Ct. at 1298.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1299.
173 Id.
174 Id.





petitioner's conduct may disentitle him to relief."' 78 Justice Breyer
found that the Eleventh Circuit relied on this very same maxim as
authority for acting outside the Rules and not requiring prejudice.' 7 9
Furthermore, Justice Breyer recognized that (1) Congress rejected a
draft Rule that would have eased the burden of the prejudice require-
ment by presuming prejudice after a delay of five years,' 80 and (2)
since 1986 more than eighty bills proposing presumptions of preju-
dice after certain time periods have failed.18 1
The Court's fourth reason for overruling the Eleventh Circuit's
decision was a narrow interpretation of Gomez v. United States District
Court for the Northern District of California.182 The Eleventh Circuit un-
derstood Gomez to mean a court could refuse a first habeas petition for
generalized "equitable" reasons.183 According to the Court, however,
Gomez simply meant established "equitable" rules apply regardless of
what vehicle a petitioner uses to bring a habeas petition. 184 Justice
Breyer distinguished Gomez by emphasizing that "equitable" rules were
appropriate there because it was the petitioner's fifth petition, not his
first like that of Larry Lonchar.185
The Court also examined its proposition in Gomez that a "'court
may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execu-
tion in deciding whether to grant equitable relief."186 In giving its
fifth reason for allowing a stay of execution, the Court again stated
that Gomez involved a successive petition, not a first, and that Habeas
Corpus Rule 9 (b) directly authorizes dismissal of successive, not first,
petitions for unduly late filings as "abuse of the writ."187
Finally, Justice Breyer recognized that other circumstances upon
which the Eleventh Circuit relied were unimportant and irrelevant to
the Court's decision. 88 The "next friend" petitions did not aggravate
or mitigate Lonchar's delay in filing his own petition; a possible state-
law procedural bar to the petition was at most an issue which required
litigation and therefore a stay of execution; and consideration of




181 Id. at 1301 (citing Appendix to the opinion).
182 Id.
183 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 593 (1995).
184 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
185 Id.
186 Id. (quoting Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654
(1992)).





B. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment' 90 but dis-
agreed with the Court's reasoning.' 9 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist pro-
posed that decisions regarding stays of execution are not the same as
decisions regarding the merits of a habeas petition because the for-
mer involve more than determining an applicant's likelihood of suc-
cess. 192 The Chief Justice asserted that Gomez v. United States District
Court for the Northern District of California stands for the proposition that
inequitable conduct such as abusive delay and manipulation may dis-
entitle a habeas petitioner to a requested stay of execution, even if the
conduct concerns a first federal petition. 193 He also distinguished
Barefoot v. Estelle, determining that it only addresses how the merits of
a habeas petition, and not the petitioner's conduct, can determine
whether a petitioner obtains a stay.' 94 Regardless of his problems with
the Court's reasoning, Chief Justice Rehnquist still felt it proper to
overturn the Eleventh Circuit's decision because he did not feel that
Larry Lonchar's conduct constituted abuse of the writ.195
Chief Justice Rehnquist began by acknowledging that the Court
correctly determined there was no basis for denying a stay of execu-
tion since Lonchar's claims had merit.196 However, he disagreed with
the Court by drawing a distinction between denying a stay of execu-
tion based on a petition's merits and denying a stay of execution
based on a petitioner's conduct.197 The Chief Justice read Gomez
broadly, deciding that "a habeas petitioner's misconduct in applying
for a stay of execution may disentitle him to the stay even if the peti-
tion is his first."' 98 This conclusion was tenable, Rehnquist reasoned,
because (1) Gomez stated that abusive delay and obvious manipulation
attempts constituted equities for a court to consider in ruling on an
execution stay, and (2) Gomez stated that this abuse could prevent a
court from granting a stay even if merit-based factors which the Court
laid out in McCleskey v. Zant did not.199 In fact, Chief Justice Rehn-
189 Id.
190 Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined ChiefJustice Rehnquist's concurrence
in the judgment.
191 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1304 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
192 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
193 Id. at 1306 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
194 Id. at 1306-07 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
195 Id. at 1307 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
196 Id. at 1304 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
197 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
198 Id. at 1306 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
199 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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quist pointed out that the Court in Gomez explicitly avoided vacating
the stay because of the petition's merits, instead opting to dismiss the
petition based on the petitioner's abusive conduct.200
Chief Justice Rehnquist then criticized the majority's interpreta-
tion of Barefoot v. Estelle as a proposition that a court must grant a stay
if it does not dismiss a first federal habeas petitionon the merits.201
The Chief Justice emphasized that Barefoot only addressed how the
merits of a habeas petition, and not the petitioner's conduct, may de-
termine whether a petitioner obtains a stay.202 He also pointed out
language in the Barefoot decision which seems contradictory to the ma-
jority's belief that a decision on a first federal habeas petition is neces-
sary to validate a state conviction:
'[t]he role of federal habeas proceedings ... is secondary and limited.
Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials .... The
procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly consideration and disposi-
tion of habeas petitions are not legal entitlements that a defendant has a
right to pursue irrespective of the contribution these procedures make
toward uncovering constitutional error.'2 03
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist eventually concurred with the
Court's judgment in overturning the Eleventh Circuit's decision be-
cause he neither felt that a court could dismiss Lonchar's first federal
habeas petition on its merits, nor felt that Lonchar's conduct had
been abusive.204
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's real purpose was to
narrow the scope of the per curiam opinion in Gomez v. United States
District Court for the Northern District of California205 and to protect the
availability of first federal habeas corpus petitions. Gomez was suffi-
ciently terse and vague to allow different valid interpretations of
whether it permitted a court to dismiss a first petition based on a peti-
tioner's abusive conduct. Justice Breyer could have entirely avoided
this question based on the Court's unanimous opinion that Larry
Lonchar's conduct was not abusive.20 6 Instead, he chose to clarify the
holding of Gomez and thereby prevent lower courts from using the
200 Id. at 1305-06 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
201 Id. at 1306 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
202 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
203 Id. at 1307 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Barefoot v. Es-
tile, 463 U.S. 880, 887-88 (1983)).
204 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
205 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
206 The four Justices who chose not to join in the majority still concurred in the judg-
ment. See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1295.
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"abuse of the writ" doctrine to dismiss first federal habeas petitions.20 7
Justice Breyer's reasoning for this action was consistent with congres-
sional intent and Supreme Court precedent because courts developed
the abuse of the writ doctrine in regards to successive petitions
only,20 8 and Congress has already codified statutes which are relevant
to a petitioner's conduct in the instance of a first petition.20 9
A. DID THE GO MEZ COURT INTEND TO SUBJECT FIRST FEDERAL HABEAS
PETITIONERS TO THE SAME CONDUCT STANDARDS AS
SUCCESSIVE PETITIONERS?
Both Justice Breyer's majority opinion21 and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's concurrence in the judgment21' give plausibly valid interpreta-
tions of the scant language in Gomez. Their disagreement arises
mainly because the factual aspects of the Gomez decision make its in-
tended coverage ambiguous.212 Specifically, the Federal Habeas
Corpus Rules did not apply in Gomez due to the form in which the
petitioner brought his final claim.21-
The petitioner in Gomez, Robert Alton Harris, brought a claim
which contested California's method of execution as cruel and unu-
sual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.21 4 Rather than bringing the claim as a habeas
corpus petition, he instead brought it as a member of a class-action
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.215 Presumably it was the inapplicability
of the Habeas Corpus Rules to this type of claim which led the Gomez
court to decree that "[e]ven if we were to assume, however, that Har-
ris could avoid the application of McCleskey to bar his claim, we would
not consider it on the merits. Whether his claim is framed as a habeas
petition or as a § 1983 action, Harris seeks an equitable remedy."216
It is reasonable to infer, as Justice Breyer did,2 1 7 that the Court's
language indicates McCleskey's abuse of the writ doctrine would have
governed the petitioner's case if the petitioner had brought the action
as a habeas petition. This assumption is justifiable for two reasons.
207 See id. at 1297, 1301.
208 See generaly McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
209 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rules 4, 9(a), 9(b) (1976).
210 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1295.
211 Id. at 1304 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
212 See gneray Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653
(1992).
213 See id. at 653-54.
214 See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1305 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
215 Id. at 1306 n.3 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
216 Gome 503 U.S. at 653-54.
217 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
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First, McCleskey's abuse of the writ doctrine was meant to apply to sec-
ond or successive petitions, 218 and the Gomez Court noted that Harris
had already filed four habeas petitions.219 Second, the Court also
noted that Harris had made no convincing showing of cause for his
failure to raise the cruel and unusual punishment claim in his prior
petitions.220 This situation of raising a new ground which a petitioner
should have included in an earlier petition was precisely one which
McCleskey listed as being abusive and subject to dismissal.22'
While McCleskey could not directly govern the non-habeas pro-
ceeding at issue in Gomez, Justice Breyer decided that McCleskey's equi-
table abuse of the writ principles could.222 Again, this is reasonable
because the Gomez Court pointed out that Harris was still seeking an
equitable remedy similar to habeas corpus relief even if he did not
bring his petition in habeas form.223 This, Breyer believed, was all
that Gomez intended to state.224 His statement that "Gomez did not,
and did not purport to, work a significant change in the law applica-
ble to the dismissal of first habeas petitions"2 25 finds strong support in
the fact that the Gomez Court made specific reference to Harris having
filed four previous petitions.226 The Gomez Court was likely using this
fact in the first paragraph to frame the later discussion concerning the
applicability of the equitable rationale behind abuse of the writ
doctrine.227
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist saw a contrary significance to
the mention of the four previous petitions.228 Because of that refer-
ence's placement in the first paragraph, Rehnquist was of the opinion
that the "[e]ven if.. ." language22 9 of the second paragraph had to
refer to all situations involving habeas petitions.2 30 He proposed that
if the second paragraph only referred to successive petitions, then it
would have been superfluous.2 31 This argument is not persuasive.
While the per curiam opinion would probably accomplish the same
objectives with or without the second of its two paragraphs, that does
218 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991).
219 Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653.
220 Id.
221 McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 489.
222 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
223 See Gome, 503 U.S. at 653-54.
224 Lo-char, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
225 Id.
226 See Gome, 503 U.S. at 653.
227 See id.
228 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1306 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
229 See note 216 and accompanying text.
230 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. 1306 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
231 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
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not necessarily suggest that the second paragraph's inclusion is either
significant or insignificant. Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to consider
that the Gomez Court may have inserted the second paragraph merely
for clarity. He also weakened his argument by failing to explain the
rationale behind his superfluousness contention.232
Another argument which Rehnquist raised is worthy of stronger
consideration. There are two plausible readings of the "[e]ven if' lan-
guage23 3 in Gomez. One, which the majority adopted, assumes that
Harris could have "avoid[ed] the application of McCleskey" because he
used a non-habeas vehicle to bring his claim.23 4 A second reading,
which Chief Justice Rehnquist espoused, is that the Court was speak-
ing hypothetically of a situation where any petitioner could "avoid the
application of McCleskey."235 One such situation would be a first
habeas petition because McCleskey's abuse of the writ doctrine con-
cerns successive petitions only.23 6 Thus, the Gomez Court was stating
that, along with other possible avenues where McCleskey would be inap-
plicable, it would not consider first habeas petitions if they involved
conduct indicating abusive delay.
While it would seem that Barefoot v. Estelle establishes precedent
against Rehnquist's theory, he correctly noted that it may not be ex-
actly relevant.23 7 While Barefoot intimates that a court should grant a
stay of execution if it cannot dismiss a first petition on its merits,23 8
there is no specific discussion of how the petitioner's conduct might
affect the decision. Regardless, even if Rehnquist could get around
the Barefoot precedent, he cannot get around the plain words of the
Gomez decision. The Court there unequivocally stated that it was ex-
amining a situation where Harris-who had previously brought four
habeas petitions-could avoid the application of McCleskey.239 If the
Court had meant to consider situations involving first petitions, as
Rehnquist suggested, 240 then it surely would have used broader ge-
neric language such as "a petitioner" instead of specifically naming
Harris. Also, despite Barefoofs possible silence regarding the conduct
of the petitioner, the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules Advisory Commit-
tee's Note specifically indicates that the framers drafted Rule 9(a) to
232 See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
233 See note 216 and accompanying text.
234 See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
235 See id. at 1306 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
236 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991).
237 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1306-07 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
238 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893-94 (1983).
239 Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (per
curiam).
240 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1306 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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account for conduct concems.2 41 Rule 9 (a), which is applicable to all
habeas petitions, allows a court to dismiss even a first petition if a peti-
tioner unreasonably delays its filing to a point where the state is
prejudiced in its ability to respond.24 In fact, when drafting this rule,
the framers even took into account the equitable maxim that a peti-
tioner's conduct may disentitle him to relief.243 This ultimately seems
to swing the balance in favor ofJustice Breyer's opinion that (1) Gomez
referred only to a special situation involving a successive habeas peti-
tion, (2) Gomez did not make first federal habeas petitions subject to
the abuse of the writ doctrine which'govems successive petitions, and
(3) Gomez did not create new standards for dismissing first habeas peti-
tions which are different from the standards in the existing Federal
Habeas Corpus Rules.244
B. THE FIRST FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION: JUSTICE BREYER USES
LONCH-AR TO STRENGTHEN THE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO
THE HIGHEST SAFEGUARD OF LIBERTY.
All nine Justices unanimously agreed that Larry Lonchar's con-
duct was not abusive. 245 This factual determination alone would have
been sufficient for the Court to overrule the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion to vacate Lonchar's execution stay.246 HoweverJustice Breyer no
doubt recognized that Gomez had left lower courts confused about the
exact standards which they should use to evaluate first federal habeas
petitions. Overruling the Eleventh Circuit's decision on purely factual
grounds would have implied that the Court accepted that circuit's in-
terpretation of the law, and other courts of appeals would likely have
followed the Eleventh Circuit's reading of Gomez and allowed dismissal
of first petitions for inequitable conduct. Realizing that he needed to
close the door on this possibility and that he had the necessary votes
to do it, Justice Breyer used the Lonchar opinion to render Gomez and
abuse of the writ doctrine inapplicable to first federal habeas peti-
tions.247 Justice Breyer's protection of the ability to bring first peti-
tions receives support from the existing Federal Habeas Corpus Rules,
modem legislative history, and other Supreme Court decisions.
First, the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules already provide well-de-
241 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a) note (1994).
242 Id. § 2254 Rule 9(a) (1994).
243 Id. § 2254 Rule 9(a) note (1994).
244 See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
245 The fourJustices who chose not to join in the majority opinion still concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 1295.
246 See Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995).
247 See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
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fined avenues for dismissing first habeas petitions.248 One of these,
Rule 9(a), allows a court to dismiss a first petition if the petitioner's
conduct was improper and prejudiced the state's ability to respond. 249
The legislative history of the Rules shows that Congress was reluctant
to further compromise a petitioner's ability to bring a first petition.250
Congress removed from an early draft of Rule 9 (a) a provision that
would have presumed prejudice on the part of the petitioner if he or
she had brought the habeas claim after a delay of more than five
years. 251 This indicates that Congress considered the petitioner's
right to bring a first petition more important than any problems
which the passage of time might cause.
Second, the United States Congress has been hesitant to restrict
the present availability of first habeas petitions. While more than
eighty bills in the past ten years proposed a statute of limitations for
instituting federal habeas corpus proceedings, 252 none succeeded un-
til Congress finally passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996.253 The relevant habeas corpus provisions of the Act
strive to lessen abuse of the writ by further restricting a petitioner's
ability to bring successive petitions254 and by implementing a one year
statute of limitations for bringing any federal petition.25 5 However,
the Supreme Court has already decreed that "although the Act does
impose new conditions on [the Court's] authority to grant relief, it
does not deprive [the] Court of jurisdiction to entertain original
habeas petitions."256 Similarly, in congressional hearings which oc-
curred immediately prior to the Antiterrorism Act's introduction, one
of the Act's main senatorial sponsors specifically voiced his support
248 Id. § 2254 Rules 4, 9(a) (1994).
249 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
250 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1471, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 2478, 2481.
251 Compare Rules of Procedure: Communication from the ChiefJustice of the United States Trans-
mitting Rules and Forms Governing Proceedings Under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28, H.R.
Doc. No. 94-464, at 38-39 (1976), with 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a).
252 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1303 (appendix to the opinion of the Court).
253 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
254 See id. at §§ 105, 106.
255 Id. at § 101. Section 101 provides that
[t]he limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which thejudgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
256 Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2337 (1996).
[Vol. 871012
HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS 1013
for the availability of first petitions.2 7 Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah,
the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, testified that
"[h]abeas corpus reform must not discourage legitimate petitions that
are clearly meritorious and deserve close scrutiny."258 He stated that it
was his intention to pass a bill "that will guarantee prisoners one com-
plete and fair course of collateral review in the federal system, free
from the time pressures of impending execution and with the assist-
ance of competent counsel for the defendant."2 9
Thus, there is a clear legislative intent to ensure prisoner access
to the protections of the Great Writ. The existence of the Federal
Rules obviates the need for ad hoc judicial discretion.260 Adding re-
strictions to first petitions would not be acting where Congress has
been silent, but rather ignoring specific limits which Congress has
placed on judicial discretion to dismiss first federal habeas petitions.
Finally, the Supreme Court has handed down 110 decisions re-
garding habeas corpus proceedings since the beginning of 1976,261
257 Senate Judicuny Comm. Hearing on Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Pisoners'
Abuse of theJudidal Process, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on theJudiciary).
258 Id.
259 Id. In the same hearings, a high-ranking member of the Department ofJustice also
cautioned against restricting the availability of first petitions: "Shortening the habeas
corpus process need not mean giving short shrift to constitutional claims .... We support
streamlining the process while preserving the traditional role of the federal courts by hav-
ing one full round of federal habeas review." Id. (statement of Kevin DiGregory, United
States Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division). Also, when signing the Act
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abusive conduct.264 This solidifies the availability of first petitions be-
cause a state is rarely able to prove that a petitioner's conduct
prejudiced its ability to prosecute. However, it is doubtful for two rea-
sons that there will be noticeable consequences. First, the Court will
rarely, if ever, confront the issue. Death row inmates will suffer dire
consequences if they hesitate in bringing their petitions, and other
prisoners generally do not wait because they logically prefer release
sooner to release later.2 6 5 Second, courts had not interpreted Gomez
as ChiefJustice Rehnquist did prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Larry Lonchar's case.2 66 Therefore, the view which Rehnquist took
had not gained widespread acceptance or attention.
Still, a minor change may occur. Prisoners may file a marginally
greater number of first federal habeas petitions.' A majority of these
claims will come from long-jailed inmates who have never filed a
habeas corpus petition. The Lonchar decision may give them confi-
dence that courts will at least consider the merits of their petitions,
rather than summarily dismissing them for abusive delay. Also, as this
Note previously pointed out, ifJustice Breyer had simply relied on the
Court's unanimous finding of nonabusive conduct, lower courts likely
would have seen the Court as tacitly approving the Eleventh Circuit's
improper reading of Gomez By instead clarifying Gomez's meaning,
Justice Breyer prevented a possibly large expansion ofjudicial discre-
tion concerning the dismissal of first petitions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court held that a court may not dis-
miss a first federal habeas corpus petition for special ad hoc equitable
reasons outside the framework of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules.26 7
By not simply finding Larry Lonchar's conduct nonabusive, but rather
going further and limiting the applicability of Gomez to successive peti-
tions, Justice Breyer foreclosed a possible avenue for the dismissal of
first petitions and protected their availability. The Court was justified
in reaching this result because congressional intent and judge-made
legal doctrines support the preservation of access to first petitions.
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